In his most recent book The Empirical Stance (2002), Bas van Fraassen elaborates earlier suggestions of a religious view that shares striking parallels with his constructive empiricism. A particularly salient feature consists in the critical distance maintained towards theoretical formulations both in science and religion. Van Fraassen therefore gives preference to a mystical approach of religious experience. Alternatively I suggest a view built on mediation by the word, both in the structure of reality and the encounter between persons. Without falling prey to rationalist illusions, such an approach allows for true human knowledge as embedded in transcendent Wisdom. It implies a more radical break with the Enlightenment ideal of neutral and universal knowledge than van Fraassen's program, as he still maintains a kind of immanent grounding of knowledge in the form of direct, unmediated experience, in spite of his claimed rejection of classical foundationalism. We can thus overcome the antithetical ring that characterizes his notion of rationality understood as bridled irrationality and escape relativism without forgetting the lessons that we have learned from the collapse of positivism and to which van Fraassen rightly draws our attention.
Introduction
Until the publication of The Empirical Stance 2 , van Fraassen's religious approach had to be reconstructed from passing comments scattered in several articles, not all of them easily accessible. His recent book allows us to draw a coherent picture of his views on religion, which is in line with his earlier comments. Far from only expressing his private opinion, without any relevance for academic discussion, van Fraassen's statements on religion constitute a worthwhile area of study for everybody interested in constructive empiricism. In fact, there are striking parallels between his theological stance, his epistemology and his philosophy of science. Reflection on his religious approach may provide us with the clue which will show us how to go beyond van Fraassen's understanding of rationality as bridled irrationality, without falling prey to the illusions of foundationalism, or what some name the "Enlightenment project" 3 .
An empiricist's religion
In line with van Fraassen's empiricism, the religious approach we find in his writings starts out and finds its roots in experience. For example, he considers that the question of God's existence is equivalent to asking if "it ever really happen [s] We find here an exact parallel to what constructive empiricism has to say about science. If it was necessary to prove that van Fraassen's stance on religion is not a private opinion, without any link to his philosophical commitments, it could be shown that he draws himself a comparison between what amounts to antirealism in both science and religion:
Suppose that, in a philosophical way, I do not understand […] science or religion.
It might be one thing to take me by the hand and lead me into relevant experience. That might allow me to acquire a deeper sense of insight into those aspects of human existence. It would be quite another thing -and to the empiricists of little or no value -to postulate that there are certain entities or realms of being about which […] The fight against the laws of nature thus joins hands with the rejection of metaphysical simulacra of God -both are but facets of the same empirical rebellion against all attempts to put shadows of theoretical descriptions in the place of real human experience in all its richness.
Bas van Fraassen's writings suggest that the parallel between anti-realism in science and in religion can be taken one step further. Not only do the scientist and the believer exhibit the same detachment with regard to theoretical formulations of their experience (at 5 Ibid. p.1, 29.
6 VAN FRAASSEN (1994a) , p.312. Cf. VAN FRAASSEN (2002) , p.177f, where van Fraassen draws a parallel between, on the one hand, realism and secularism, both satisfied with the results of objectifying inquiry, and, on the other, anti-realism and a "continuing sense of wonder", leaving room for the encounter with the wholly Other. least if they are faithful empiricists), but anti-realism in science and religion feed on each other. On the one hand, constructive empiricism goes with a characteristic uncertainty about how our world is; such perplexity leaves in turn room for other than scientific approaches to reality. To exclude the religious dimension, van Fraassen writes "is all very well only for someone who feels quite certain of knowing pretty well what there is in the universe and what that universe is like. I have no such certainty 7 ."
On the other hand, faith teaches us not to set our heart on "earthly treasures".
Whatever we need to construct in order to guide our lives as rational agents -scientific theories, a coherent view of ourselves and the world -, the encounter of the wholly Other allows us to treat them "as temporary, tradable assets of our present stage of life, as tools and resources for our pilgrimage through this world." The religious knows how to find comfort when faced with the disconcerting perspective that anti-realism has to offer: "it is only the secular […] who have reason to fear that life without a world-view will be a life without meaning or value ."
In addition to the rejection of metaphysics, van Fraassen's account of religion and constructive empiricism also share positive elements. Sometimes his empiricism gets misrepresented by one-sided insistence on its" anti"-element. It certainly is a branch of antirealism, refusing to commit itself to the truthfulness of scientific theories (in so far as they concern the unobservable realm). However, it should not be equated to wholesale skepticism, not even with "a life of utilitarian calculation and prudence -what Bradley called a shopkeeper's life of always a little bit more, a little bit less 9 ." The scientist has to immerse himself in the world picture which the theories offer him; only if he accepts to inhabit the construction of reality that contemporary science proposes, will he be able to participate meaningfully in scientific practice. Anti-realism does not allow the scientist to go beyond the 7 VAN FRAASSEN (2002) Religion involves a deep personal commitment, beyond and above any historical proofs or doctrinal formulations. For van Fraassen, faith in God may even survive the destruction of the very center of the actual Christian belief that is God's revelation in Christ. It is therefore a stance that is not ultimately linked to its present formulation -very much in line with the empiricist attitude which also transcends the theories that guide scientific practice. Thus, religion and empiricism have the necessary potential to live through the traumas of deep conceptual revolutions; as stances, they persist in a world which does not offer any guarantee of factual stability.
In spite of striking parallels between van Fraassen's stances in religion and philosophy of science, differences subsist. The role that theoretical constructions play in science and in religion is not identical, albeit the noted similitudes. Whereas van Fraassen rejects all the desperate efforts of logical positivism to eliminate theoretical entities from science, he considers that metaphysical theories and natural theology do not accomplish any productive work in religion. If one looks for an element in religious practice that is similar to theories in science, one should instead turn to the doctrinal formulations of the ecumenical creeds. In contrast to the writings of most contemporary philosophers of religion, these ancient creeds allow for mystery, inherent in every formulation of religious experience 13 . The fact that van Fraassen practices faith inside a particular religious tradition (that is Roman Catholicism), which has its doctrinal statements, suggests that his understanding of mystical religion allows for certain kinds of linguistic expressions of religious experience. That such historical formulations of faith are ultimately revisable on van Fraassen's view does not distinguish 12 VAN FRAASSEN (1993b) , p.323. religious theories from scientific ones, which participate as well in the fluidity of the empiricist world.
Mystical experience and the word
The provisional character of all religious formulations -even with regard to central claims -agrees with van Fraassen's conviction that "the only true religion is mystical Ibid. p.176f.
experience; but it has never more than an ancillary function and remains inadequate to express the reality encountered.
Therefore the mystical understanding of religion shows striking similarities to constructive empiricism in science. Mystical religion is built on experience, the only source of true insight accepted by the empiricist. Thus it perfectly suits van Fraassen's approach to both science and religion, when he concludes The Empirical Stance by a reformulation of Socrates' answer to Cratylus:
If we can learn about things both from the words about them and from those things themselves, which is likely to be the clearer and nobler way 16 
?
Reality not words, experience not concepts -such is the war cry of the empiricist. Theories, be they religious or scientific ones, are useful tools, yes even a constitutive element of the corresponding forms of life; but they remain forever inadequate to express the realities with which the believer or the scientist are in contact. Going beyond the antinomy might also allow us to recover truthful speech in religion. In a Judaeo-Christian perspective, the mystic's emphasis on ineffable experience does not agree readily with the centrality of God's Word. In fact, the traditional understanding does not see in the Bible an imperfect witness to the human experience of the divine, but rather God revealing Himself in the Holy Writ. The verbal form of this revelation does not constitute a defect that is transcended in true religious experience; it is constitutive of the manner by which God has made Himself known. Encounter with the divine should therefore not be sought beyond the Word, but always in, through and by God's verbal self-disclosure. As Martin Luther writes: "We must hold firmly to the conviction that God gives no one his Spirit or grace except through or with the external Word which comes before 23 ."
Where we accept mediation by the Word, we can confess God's transcendence, without inviting skepticism concerning the validity of speech about God. In this way, the antithesis between religious experience and doctrine can be overcome. Even the nineteenth- ." Might it be that paradoxically mystical religion destroys the very treasure that it was called to preserve?
Mysticism certainly has, in most of its historical expressions, spoken of union with God and aimed at the fusion of the believer into the divine reality. In spite of mystical voices inside Jewish and Christian traditions, it is obvious that such language, at least understood literally, stands in clear tension with the distinction between the Creator and the creature that structures Biblical thought. God's transcendence is not in any way well served by efforts to achieve mystical union with the divine, and pantheism may well not be far away.
The world as text
Language is not only fundamental to religious experience in the Biblical tradition because of God's self-disclosure in the sacred texts, but the Scriptures also use the metaphor of speech in relation to the structure of the world. The opening chapter of Genesis has already shown God's Word giving rise to an ordered universe. Divine Word structuring reality is given special importance in the New Testament in that creation and its corollary, the providential sustaining of the world, are specifically attributed to Christ, called the Logos in the opening verses of the fourth gospel. From this perspective, the universe is a "speaking" The infinite reveals itself […] as primary.
[…T]his inversion means that the infinite precedes the finite -human thought, which organizes and deploys its sciences -as a horizon forever already prepared to welcome in advance its every progress and desire 28 . As the finite human reason cannot comprehend the infinite, the infinite is necessarily incomprehensible. However, such incomprehensibility does not lead to ignorance. Quite to the contrary, for Descartes, God is present to the human spirit as the clearest idea:
This idea, precisely because it is infinite and the transcendental condition of all other ideas, surpasses them all epistemologically, so that the impossibility to understand it as a finite object coincides with its perfect clarity and distinctness, its incomparable truth 29 .
In fact, it is divine incomprehensibility that allows the human knower to obtain true knowledge in spite of his finitude : he can stop aiming at omniscience, without giving in to 27 VAN TIL (1969b) 
Human knowledge after foundationalism
Embedding human knowledge into the wider context of divine wisdom provides a promising venue which should be explored in order to go beyond the alternative that lies at the heart of van Fraassen's epistemology: foundationalist illusion or bridled irrationality. Van In The Empirical Stance, this strategy is generalized and applied to experience as a whole. It is not only patterns of observed, or more precisely observable, phenomena that we should not try to reduce to a postulated more fundamental layer, but experience as a whole acquires its autonomy and stands no longer in need of a theoretical foundation. Instead of looking for grounds for scientific practice, van Fraassen reads it as a form of life, where its 30 VAN TIL (1969b), p.200, and VAN TIL (1969a), p.17, 26, 135. 31 practice is the only "justification" that is needed for it epistemological standards will provide a coherent framework for empiricism after the failure of foundationalism.
"English" rationality and the specter of relativism
There is one striking feature of voluntarist epistemology as van Fraassen constructs it: personal responsibility enters the stage precisely when rational constraints on knowledge come to an end. Referring, for example, to the two epistemic desires that William James had discussed in his "The Will to Belief" -to believe truth and to avoid error -, van Fraassen highlights the point that "although truth and error are objective categories, handed to us by nature itself, so to speak, this measure of balance [of truth believed as against error avoided]
is not!" To use a term coined by Isaac Levi, it is "our individual risk quotient", "an important personal factor, differing from the stout of heart to doubting Thomas and vacillating Hamlet." Van Fraassen is clearly aware of this difficulty, as he writes: "I tried to work out a liberal epistemology. Well, to some eyes it may look not so much liberal as libertine… 43 ." It will not do to close our eyes before the historical conditioning of human knowledge, to deny our epistemic embeddedness. "The task for philosophy cannot be to execute the impossible rescue 44 ." Van Fraassen's voluntarist epistemology is thus a call to courageously face our epistemic decision without rational constraints. It shows us that "choice and its responsibility never slip from our shoulders; no recipe for rational behavior can remove them" (VAN FRAASSEN (2002) , p.100). . On the one hand, he reminds us that nothing other than a perspectival view of knowledge truly takes into account our condition of historically conditioned knowers; there is just no God's eye view available for human beings. The specter wants to whisper to us that our own perspective and standards are arbitrary if looked upon from above. "Would it not be totally arbitrary to endorse our own [perspective], the only we actually have, and say we live here, those goals are the ones which are worthwhile, that is what the world is like?" We should resist that insinuation because "by hypothesis that is the one we endorse! Endorsement reflects our own perspective, and is not endorsement if it doesn't. To say that we are arbitrary unless our endorsement is perspective-free is to hold us to a logically impossible standard, asking us to judge without judging 48 ." 45 VAN FRAASSEN (1993a), p.6-29. 46 Ibid. p.13. Although using the "common namer" Kuhn-Feyerabend relativism, van Fraassen does not preclude the question if both the philosophers held that view.
47
There is another strategy on which I do not dwell here: Van Fraassen points out that we know how to locate ourselves on inaccurate maps (ibid. p.13f). This certainly is an interesting direction to explore when it comes to describe how knowledge works practically. But it does not help to counter Kuhn-Feyerabend relativism on a more fundamental level, because, in order to know that a map represents, even if inaccurately, we already need to be assured that we have epistemic access to reality.
48
This first strategy certainly is in line with van Fraassen's insistence on philosophical positions as stances; however, it comes down, in the end, to a re-affirmation of my commitment to my worldview -which normally does not count as a legitimate answer to relativism. Even if it was true that such an answer were the best we are capable of, it should not count as refutation of relativism. If we had to acknowledge such a desperate situation as ours, the only rational course of action would be to turn into self-conscious relativists.
Yet, this is not the direction van Fraassen is willing to take. The second strategy then brings into play his empiricism: "Since I hope and try to be an empiricist, I want to resist Kuhn-Feyerabend relativism with all my might 49 ." It is experience that comes to rescue us from the threat of relativism. Already in The Scientific Image, he had drawn the distinction between "observing" and "observing that": for example, a Stone Age native may see a tennis ball without seeing that it is a tennis ball, because he does not know anything about tennis , he seems to be willing to recognize a kernel of experience that does not depend on any theory-or value-laden appreciation by the subject. In particular with regard to the observable-unobservable distinction, fundamental to constructive empiricism, he insists that it "is in no important sense theory-relative or theory-dependent 52 ."
We can see by now that both strategies of defense merge into one: the appeal to experience as the grounds where all questions end. As in van Fraassen's post-positivist framework all experience is perspectival, dependent on our historical and social setting, it can come to us only in multiple forms: experience is necessarily my experience -or perhaps better the experience of the community I choose to identify with. Experience, 49 Ibid. p.13. understood in this existential posture, is therefore the only guarantee that the empirical stance has to offer against relativism -it is part of its commitment that such a guarantee suffices.
Foundationalism in post-modern clothes?
The appeal to experience is without any doubt essential to the empirical stance. But may it not be the backdoor by which foundationalism will creep in once again? In order to protect himself against debilitating skepticism (and probably also to keep in line with established scientific practice), the empiricist, even after having listened to Kuhn and We discover here a far-reaching tension in van Fraassen's program. He has set out to provide an account of human knowledge after the failure of foundationalism. In fact, we have seen him reject the Enlightenment project, with its demands of a theoretical grounding and universally valid standards of justification. Yet, he has not given up on the project of constructing (at least a prolegomenon of) an empiricist epistemology, with its reference to human experience as the touchstone of all convictions. Thereby he turns experience, albeit his explicit rejection of foundationalism, into a certain kind of foundation. To be fair to van 52 VAN FRAASSEN Bas (1993a), p.19. 53 Fraassen, one has to point out that this newly found epistemic grounding is neither theoretical nor universal; therefore he has clearly broken with the Enlightenment ideal of knowledge. But, he does not (and cannot, if he wants to resist relativism) give up on searching for some resting place for our knowledge.
It should be noted that the empiricist "foundation" is of an immanent, this-worldly kind.
Not withstanding all his protests, van Fraassen is therefore perhaps closer to Cartesian By using this common namer, I do not take any stand concerning the question if Descartes himself was Cartesian in this sense. His thought might be subtler than current received ideas would suggest. Especially, the place of God in his system might be more capital than some modern commentators are willing to accept.
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SHERRINGHAM (1992), p.122.
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A qualification that van Fraassen explicitly uses to describe his position (alongside the adjective "postfoundationalist") in VAN FRAASSEN (1999a) 
Salvation through radicalism
Having discovered deep-reaching tensions in van Fraassen's program, which might well not find any solution inside this framework, it is time to remind ourselves of the other insinuation that Descartes' thought offers us, according to Jean-Luc Marion's interpretation:
the necessity to embed human knowledge in the wider context of divine wisdom. In a certain sense, this perspective is even more radical than van Fraassen's voluntarist epistemology.
The empirical stance tries to establish knowledge on the basis of unmediated, personal experience, thus it maintains some kind of immanent grounds in spite of its declared rejection of foundationalism. Thereby, it does not escape the temptation of positing an immanent foundation -be it non theoretical and perspectival -instead of receiving 57 VAN FRAASSEN Bas (1994b) only think with reference to the divine, they will always sacralize one aspect of the created realm, so long as they do not accept the transcendent foundation of all knowledge. But the religious absolutization of particular aspects cannot fail to call forth their correlates, which in the religious consciousness begin to claim an absoluteness opposite to that of the deified ones.
In other words, any idol that has been created by the absolutization of a modal aspect evokes its counter idol.
Consequently, the dialectical basic motives are always characterized by an ultimate antithesis. This antithesis divides the religious impulse of the ego and thereby prevents the insight into the radical unity of the human selfhood in its central relation to the whole of our temporal horizon of experience 61 . Even more precisely, the opposition between rational constraints and moral responsibility, which plays an important role in van Fraassen's concept of rationality as bridled irrationality, seems to be indebted to the antithesis between nature and liberty, by To be sure, science is, as every human undertaking, fallible. The history of science is not only the history of past successes, but also the history of (by now largely forgotten) failures. A realistic assessment of the powers of scientific reason should guard us from overestimating the attained knowledge and keep us humble, open to a change of mind in the face of new evidence. Nevertheless, we may very well want to resist the dark perspectives that empiricism has to offer. Notwithstanding all its estimate for natural sciences, the empirical stance comes down to a profound doubt of the human capacity to grasp nature's structures, because after all there might be none.
With a touch of contempt for the consolations which realism offers, van Fraassen acknowledges "that empiricism deprives us of so much that might comfort us in a hostile world 67 ". Divine incomprehensibility as the framework within which to place human knowledge provides an alternative that holds the promise to enable us to escape empiricism's irrationalist features, without falling prey to the illusions of complete knowledge.
It allows us to acknowledge that there is more under heaven and on earth than what scientific methods can grasp, and to hold at the same time on to the fundamentally ordered character of reality, being grounded in the transcendent Creator. Thus the conspicuously antithetical relation between reason and nature in van Fraassen's program (and empiricism in general) looses its grip on our imagination.
In an analogous vein, such a vision permits us to overcome van Fraassen's epistemic antithesis, while taking very seriously the failure of foundationalism which he rightly highlights. It is possible to resist his lead in opposing rational constraints and personal responsibility, without adhering to a simplistic conception of human reason following a certain number of fixed rules. Yes, our moral responsibility is engaged in the epistemic 66 VAN FRAASSEN (2002) , p.224; italics are mine.
endeavor. As knowers, we exercise our will and are held responsible for our choices. But in an Augustinian understanding of freedom, our liberty consists in adhering freely to the truth that God's Word sets before us. It does not presuppose a reality that is fundamentally unstructured (at least prior to the imposition of order by human reason), but builds on the personal act of divine creation. The Christian conception of Christ sustaining the universe allows us in particular to harmonize the idea of a structured world and personal commitment.
Nominalism is not the only exit after the failure of foundationalism.
Conclusion
When we are faced with the discomforting perspectives that constructive empiricism offers, it will not do to return to "classical" modernism. Once awakened from our dogmatic sleep (in its modern guise), we should not (and most probably cannot) forget the farreaching challenges that have been addressed to the Enlightenment project. It is too easy to try to deny the role of personal commitment in all knowledge, to downplay the revolutionary character of (at least some) new scientific theories, to forget the crucial importance and potential multiplicity of presuppositions or to cling to a naive realism, building on a supposedly direct access of reason to nature's patterns. Van Fraassen's empirical stance shows us the right direction, and we should not look back with nostalgia to the bad old days of Cartesian foundationalism and logical positivism.
Yet, the antitheses that creep up in his thought may serve as indicators that he has not yet reached an integrated view. Reichenbach pointed out that classical empiricism was doomed to fail because it accepted, despite all its rhetoric against rationalism, the terms in which its enemy had set the agenda for any account of knowledge. If empiricism were to succeed, it had to be more than a reaction to rationalism that leaves its very presuppositions unchallenged. His call for a third way, on which van Fraassen elaborates 68 , has to be heard once more. Voluntarist epistemology may share too much with its foe, to help us escape from the illusions of foundationalism. We have to look for a third way: only a more radical break with the modern paradigm will allow us to get away from the antitheses that hamper voluntarist epistemology. I am conscious that the above remarks on human knowledge relying on God's Word that structures the universe, are not more than quick strokes of the paintbrush, that need to be elaborated. I hope that they show us how to proceed from the stimulating insights that have been gained from The Empirical Stance.
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